2023-06-14 10:29:52 +00:00
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title = "Encryption"
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weight = 50
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Encryption is a recurring subject when discussing Garage.
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Garage does not handle data encryption by itself, but many things can
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already be done with Garage's current feature set and the existing ecosystem.
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This page takes a high level approach to security in general and data encryption
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in particular.
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# Examining your need for encryption
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- Why do you want encryption in Garage?
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- What is your threat model? What are you fearing?
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- A stolen HDD?
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- A curious administrator?
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- A malicious administrator?
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- A remote attacker?
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- etc.
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- What services do you want to protect with encryption?
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- An existing application? Which one? (eg. Nextcloud)
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- An application that you are writing
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- Any expertise you may have on the subject
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This page explains what Garage provides, and how you can improve the situation by yourself
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by adding encryption at different levels.
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We would be very curious to know your needs and thougs about ideas such as
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encryption practices and things like key management, as we want Garage to be a
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serious base platform for the developpment of secure, encrypted applications.
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Do not hesitate to come talk to us if you have any thoughts or questions on the
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subject.
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# Capabilities provided by Garage
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## Traffic is encrypted between Garage nodes
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RPCs between Garage nodes are encrypted. More specifically, contrary to many
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distributed software, it is impossible in Garage to have clear-text RPC. We
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use the [kuska handshake](https://github.com/Kuska-ssb/handshake) library which
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implements a protocol that has been clearly reviewed, Secure ScuttleButt's
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Secret Handshake protocol. This is why setting a `rpc_secret` is mandatory,
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and that's also why your nodes have super long identifiers.
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2023-06-14 10:51:47 +00:00
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## HTTP API endpoints provided by Garage are in clear text
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2023-06-14 10:51:47 +00:00
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Adding TLS support built into Garage is not currently planned.
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2023-06-14 10:29:52 +00:00
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2024-03-27 09:04:35 +00:00
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## Garage stores data in plain text on the filesystem or encrypted using customer keys (SSE-C)
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For standard S3 API requests, Garage does not encrypt data at rest by itself.
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For the most generic at rest encryption of data, we recommend setting up your
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storage partitions on encrypted LUKS devices.
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If you are developping your own client software that makes use of S3 storage,
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we recommend implementing data encryption directly on the client side and never
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transmitting plaintext data to Garage. This makes it easy to use an external
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untrusted storage provider if necessary.
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Garage does support [SSE-C
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encryption](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/ServerSideEncryptionCustomerKeys.html),
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an encryption mode of Amazon S3 where data is encrypted at rest using
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encryption keys given by the client. The encryption keys are passed to the
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server in a header in each request, to encrypt or decrypt data at the moment of
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reading or writing. The server discards the key as soon as it has finished
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using it for the request. This mode allows the data to be encrypted at rest by
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Garage itself, but it requires support in the client software. It is also not
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adapted to a model where the server is not trusted or assumed to be
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compromised, as the server can easily know the encryption keys. Note however
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that when using SSE-C encryption, the only Garage node that knows the
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encryption key passed in a given request is the node to which the request is
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directed (which can be a gateway node), so it is easy to have untrusted nodes
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in the cluster as long as S3 API requests containing SSE-C encryption keys are
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not directed to them.
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Implementing automatic data encryption directly in Garage without client-side
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management of keys (something like
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[SSE-S3](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/UsingServerSideEncryption.html))
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could make things simpler for end users that don't want to setup LUKS, but also
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raises many more questions, especially around key management: for encryption of
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data, where could Garage get the encryption keys from? If we encrypt data but
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keep the keys in a plaintext file next to them, it's useless. We probably don't
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want to have to manage secrets in Garage as it would be very hard to do in a
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secure way. At the time of speaking, there are no plans to implement this in
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Garage.
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# Adding data encryption using external tools
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2023-06-14 10:51:47 +00:00
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## Encrypting traffic between a Garage node and your client
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You have multiple options to have encryption between your client and a node:
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- Setup a reverse proxy with TLS / ACME / Let's encrypt
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- Setup a Garage gateway locally, and only contact the garage daemon on `localhost`
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- Only contact your Garage daemon over a secure, encrypted overlay network such as Wireguard
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2023-06-14 10:29:52 +00:00
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## Encrypting data at rest
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Protects against the following threats:
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- Stolen HDD
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Crucially, does not protect againt malicious sysadmins or remote attackers that
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might gain access to your servers.
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Methods include full-disk encryption with tools such as LUKS.
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## Encrypting data on the client side
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Protects againt the following threats:
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- A honest-but-curious administrator
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- A malicious administrator that tries to corrupt your data
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- A remote attacker that can read your server's data
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Implementations are very specific to the various applications. Examples:
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- Matrix: uses the OLM protocol for E2EE of user messages. Media files stored
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in Matrix are probably encrypted using symmetric encryption, with a key that is
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distributed in the end-to-end encrypted message that contains the link to the object.
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2023-06-15 11:59:21 +00:00
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- XMPP: clients normally support either OMEMO / OpenPGP for the E2EE of user
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messages. Media files are encrypted per
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[XEP-0454](https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0454.html).
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2023-06-15 11:59:21 +00:00
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- Aerogramme: use the user's password as a key to decrypt data in the user's bucket
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2023-06-15 14:42:12 +00:00
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- Cyberduck: comes with support for
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[Cryptomator](https://docs.cyberduck.io/cryptomator/) which allows users to
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create client-side vaults to encrypt files in before they are uploaded to a
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cloud storage endpoint.
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