108 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
108 lines
3.9 KiB
Markdown
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title = "Encryption"
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weight = 50
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Encryption is a recurring subject when discussing Garage.
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Garage does not handle data encryption by itself, but many things can
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already be done with Garage's current feature set and the existing ecosystem.
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This page takes a high level approach to security in general and data encryption
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in particular.
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# Examining your need for encryption
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- Why do you want encryption in Garage?
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- What is your threat model? What are you fearing?
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- A stolen HDD?
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- A curious administrator?
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- A malicious administrator?
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- A remote attacker?
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- etc.
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- What services do you want to protect with encryption?
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- An existing application? Which one? (eg. Nextcloud)
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- An application that you are writing
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- Any expertise you may have on the subject
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This page explains what Garage provides, and how you can improve the situation by yourself
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by adding encryption at different levels.
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We would be very curious to know your needs and thougs about ideas such as
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encryption practices and things like key management, as we want Garage to be a
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serious base platform for the developpment of secure, encrypted applications.
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Do not hesitate to come talk to us if you have any thoughts or questions on the
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subject.
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# Capabilities provided by Garage
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## Traffic is encrypted between Garage nodes
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RPCs between Garage nodes are encrypted. More specifically, contrary to many
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distributed software, it is impossible in Garage to have clear-text RPC. We
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use the [kuska handshake](https://github.com/Kuska-ssb/handshake) library which
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implements a protocol that has been clearly reviewed, Secure ScuttleButt's
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Secret Handshake protocol. This is why setting a `rpc_secret` is mandatory,
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and that's also why your nodes have super long identifiers.
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## HTTP API endpoints provided by Garage are in clear text
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Adding TLS support built into Garage is not currently planned.
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## Garage stores data in plain text on the filesystem
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Garage does not handle data encryption at rest by itself, and instead delegates
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to the user to add encryption, either at the storage layer (LUKS, etc) or on
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the client side (or both). There are no current plans to add data encryption
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directly in Garage.
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Implementing data encryption directly in Garage might make things simpler for
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end users, but also raises many more questions, especially around key
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management: for encryption of data, where could Garage get the encryption keys
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from ? If we encrypt data but keep the keys in a plaintext file next to them,
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it's useless. We probably don't want to have to manage secrets in garage as it
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would be very hard to do in a secure way. Maybe integrate with an external
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system such as Hashicorp Vault?
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# Adding data encryption using external tools
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## Encrypting traffic between a Garage node and your client
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You have multiple options to have encryption between your client and a node:
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- Setup a reverse proxy with TLS / ACME / Let's encrypt
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- Setup a Garage gateway locally, and only contact the garage daemon on `localhost`
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- Only contact your Garage daemon over a secure, encrypted overlay network such as Wireguard
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## Encrypting data at rest
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Protects against the following threats:
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- Stolen HDD
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Crucially, does not protect againt malicious sysadmins or remote attackers that
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might gain access to your servers.
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Methods include full-disk encryption with tools such as LUKS.
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## Encrypting data on the client side
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Protects againt the following threats:
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- A honest-but-curious administrator
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- A malicious administrator that tries to corrupt your data
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- A remote attacker that can read your server's data
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Implementations are very specific to the various applications. Examples:
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- Matrix: uses the OLM protocol for E2EE of user messages. Media files stored
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in Matrix are probably encrypted using symmetric encryption, with a key that is
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distributed in the end-to-end encrypted message that contains the link to the object.
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- Aerogramme: use the user's password as a key to decrypt data in the user's bucket
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